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Abstract. The paper describes an experiment in which a framework for model
checking Java byte code, combined with the application of runtime monitoring
techniques through code rewriting, was used to guarantee correctness properties
of a Java Card applet.
1 Introduction
Java Card [Jav00] is a platform for building multi-application smart cards. It is based
on a subset of Java which omits features such as concurrency through threads, garbage
collection, and many API functions. However, to support multiple applications co-
existing on the same card (e.g., both a purse applet and a loyalty applet), there is a
notion of an applet. Java Card applets are implemented by extending the Java Card
API class javacard.framework.Applet. Briefly an implementation is required
to provide a method install which is called upon installation of an applet, methods
select and deselect for selection/deselection of a particular applet on a card, and
the “main” method process which is called by the card runtime environment (oper-
ating system) upon receiving an event from the card environment intended for that ap-
plet. An applet can also implement a method getShareableInterfaceObject
for permitting other applets on the same card to later call it.
Unfortunately the Java Card programming platform provides weak support for sep-
arating applets. For instance nothing in the standards prevents a malicious or badly
written applet from allocating all persistent memory on a card (the little there is), and
since the standard does not require garbage collection this is a very undesirable state-
of-affairs. Similar concerns exists for inter-applet calls, although they are controlled by
a rather weak firewall mechanism. Thus there are significant dangers with permitting
new applets onto a functioning smart card, and as a result one of the chief innovations
of Java Card, i.e., multiple applications co-existing on the same card, is in practise not
used much at all.
To improve upon this situation the formal design techniques group of SICS have
been using fully automatic and low-cost (in terms of execution speed and memory us-
age) verification methods that could, potentially, be used by an on (or off) card runtime
system to determine at load time whether a new, unknown, applet should be permitted
onto a card with pre-existing applets or not. In a first experiment, reported in [CFG02],
we analysed inter-method calls of multi-applet Java Card smart cards using model
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checking of Java byte code (starting from a set of class files). In this paper we extend
the treatment to memory allocation concerns. In case the safety of an applet cannot be
proved using model checking, we as a complementary technique instrument a compiled
applet with a runtime monitor to guarantee that it adheres to a safe memory allocation
policy.
To provide a semantics foundation for the analysis of Java Card applets we use
the abstract notion of a program graph, capturing the control flow of programs with
procedures/methods, and which can be efficiently computed. The behaviour of such
program graphs is defined through the notion of pushdown systems, which provide a
natural execution model for programs with methods (and possibly recursion), and for
which completely automatic model checkers for LTL exist, e.g., Moped [ES01]. The
details of the translation are elaborated in section 3.1, and sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4
describes the logic and our use of the Moped model checking tool in further detail.
The example considered in the paper is a real applet submitted by Schlumberger.
The applet is monolithic, and does not communicate with other applets. In section 4
we formalise and attempt to verify the property that no memory is allocated by an
applet (after a personalization process) using model checking. As the satisfaction of
this property is shown to depend critically on data reasoning, which requires less coarse
abstractions than the ones implemented in the call graph extraction tool, we consider
in section 5 the complementary use of runtime monitoring techniques to guarantee the
property.
2 Constructing Method Call Graphs
We use an external static analysis tool, Soot [VRHS+99], adapted to Java Card1, to gen-
erate call graphs which abstract from everything (such as data variables, and parameters
to method calls) but the presence and order of method calls inside method bodies. The
analysis tool performs a safe over-approximation (with regards to preservation of LTL
safety properties) in the sense that call edges may be present in the result call graph
even if the corresponding calls cannot be invoked at runtime, but the opposite does
not hold. For instance, when the static analysis cannot determine which class method
is invoked in a method call, typically due to subtyping, then a call edge is generated
to a target method in every possible class, thus increasing the nondeterminism in the
generated call graph. The static analysis tool generates graphs with information about
exceptional behaviours. In this work exceptional edges, and nodes, are translated into
non-deterministic constructs thus effectively increasing the non-determinism in pro-
gram behaviour in a conservative fashion.
The call graph generation is also conservative with respect to the Java Card fire-
wall mechanism, which is not considered during static analysis. That is, a method call
that at runtime will fail the security checks of the Java Card runtime environment will
nevertheless invariably be included in the method call graphs. To refine the analysis,
and to permit analysis of Java Card API usage, the API classes of SUN’s Java Card
Development Kit (version 2.1.2) are optionally included in the method call generation.
1 to handle, for instance, the absence of the java.lang.Class class
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The result of the generation process is a set of method call graphs, representing
the methods callable after invoking one of the (public) callable applet methods such as
process or install.
As we in this case study want to observe the allocation of memory by the SLB applet
the standard method call graph generation process has been augmented to additional
include information about invocations of the new and newarray Java virtual machine
(byte code) instructions. An instance of the new instruction will be represented in a
method call graph as a call to the new (synthetic) method Events.newInst and a
newarray instruction as a call to the method Events.newarrayInst.
Method Call Graphs The methods M are partitioned into classes C, which are them-
selves partitioned into packages P . We assume the usual Java naming conventions with
fully qualified names, i.e., a class has a name Package.identifier and a method has a
name Class.identifier .
Definition 1 (Method Graph, adapted from [JMT99]). A method graph is a tuple
m
∆= (Vm,→m, λm, µm)
such that:
(i) Vm are the program points of m,
(ii) →m⊆ Vm × Vm are the transfer edges of m, and
(iii) λm : Vm → T designates to each program point of m a program point type from
the set T ∆= {entry, seq, call, return}.
(iv) µm : Vm → ℘(M) designates to each program point of type call of m a non-empty
set of methods.
We assume the program point sets Vm to be pairwise disjoint. The program points
of the program is the set V ∆=
⋃
m∈M Vm.
The program point type indicates whether (entry) a node is the entry point of a
method, (seq) a node in which no method call or return takes place, (call) a node
from which a method call takes place, or (return) a node in which the execution of
the method finishes and control flow returns to the calling method.
The method call graphs extracted from a Java Card applet using the modified Soot
tool has the following invariant properties: (i) there is exactly one entry program point
per method; (ii) there is exactly one return program point per method; (iii) nondetermin-
ism in a call node is due to lack of precision in resolving the target of a method call (due
to subtyping), never due to the occurrence of two distinct calls (sequential method calls
are always separated by a transfer edge). For convenience, we introduce the predicates
v : t ∆= λm(v) = t for t ∈ T
v : locm ∆= v ∈ Vm
v : entry m ∆= v : entry ∧ v : locm
v : return m ∆= v : return ∧ v : locm
v : class c ∆= ∃m. v : locm ∧ m ∈ c
v : package p ∆= ∃c. v : class c ∧ c ∈ p
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For the sake of this case study we further define a predicate v : api, which holds if
the program point v occurs in a method in a Java Card API package (one of java.lang,
javacard.framework, visa.openplatform, javacard.security or javac-
ardx.crypto).
3 Model Checking Method Call Graphs
3.1 Pushdown Systems
Pushdown systems provide a natural execution model for programs with recursion.
They form a well-studied class of infinite-state systems for which many important prob-
lems like equivalence checking and model checking are decidable [BCMS00].
Definition 2 (PDS, from [EHRS00]). A pushdown system (PDS) is a tuple
P ∆= (P, Γ,∆)
where:
(i) P is a finite set of control locations;
(ii) Γ is a finite set of stack symbols;
(iii) ∆ ⊆ (P × Γ )× (P × Γ ?) is a finite set of rewrite rules 〈p, γ〉 −→ 〈q, σ〉.
The set P × Γ ? are the configurations of P . If 〈p, γ〉 −→ 〈q, σ〉 is a rewrite rule of
P , then for each ω ∈ Γ ? the configuration 〈q, σ · ω〉 is an immediate successor of the
configuration 〈p, γ · ω〉. A run of P is a sequence ρ = 〈p0, σ0〉 〈p1, σ1〉 〈p2, σ2〉 · · · ,
such that for all i, 〈pi+1, σi+1〉 is an immediate successor of 〈pi, σi〉.
We now define how a set of methods M induces a PDS.
Definition 3 (Induced PDS, formalising [ES01]). A set of methods M induces a PDS
P ∆= (P, Γ,∆)
as follows:
(i) P consists of the single control location p;
(ii) Γ is the set V of program points;
(iii) ∆ is the set⋃m∈M ⋃v∈Vm Prod(v), where Prod(v) is a set of rewrite rules:
{〈p, v〉 −→ 〈p, 〉} if v : return
{〈p, v〉 −→ 〈p, v′〉 | v →m v′} if v : entry or v : seq⋃
m′∈µm(v)
{ 〈p, v〉 −→ 〈p, v′ · v′′〉 | v′ : entry m′, v →m v′′ } if v : call
The rewrite rules of the pushdown system can be interpreted as simply manipulating
the calling stack of the program from which the PDS was obtained. Given a configura-
tion c ≡ 〈p, v · σ〉 let point (c) ∆= v.
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3.2 Specification Language
Our specification language is linear temporal logic (LTL), with program point pred-
icates p as atomic propositions but omitting the type predicate v : t. The choice of
linear temporal logic as the specification language, instead of for instance the modal
µ-calculus for which the model checking problem for our encoding into pushdown sys-
tems is also efficiently decidable, was solely motivated by the existence of the efficient
model checker Moped [ES01] for LTL.
The operators of the logic are the standard ones. If φ and ψ are formulas then so are
¬φ, φ ∧ ψ, φ ∨ ψ, φ ⇒ ψ, X φ and φ U ψ. The meaning of formulas is defined with
respect to runs of infinite length r ≡ c0c1c2 . . .. We let ri denote the suffix of r starting
in configuration ci. Then satisfaction r |= φ of a formula φ by a run r is defined as:
r |= p iff point (c0) : p
r |= ¬φ iff not r |= φ
r |= φ ∧ ψ iff r |= φ and r |= ψ
r |= φ ∨ ψ iff r |= φ or r |= ψ
r |= X φ iff r1 |= φ
r |= φ U ψ iff there is an i ≥ 0 such that ri |= ψ and rj |= φ for all 0 ≤ j < i
Henceforth let false abbreviate p ∧ ¬p for some atomic predicate p, true abbreviate
¬false, φ⇒ ψ abbreviate ¬φ ∨ ψ, and next φ abbreviate X φ and φ until ψ abbreviate
φ U ψ. Further define eventually φ ∆= true U φ and always φ ∆= ¬ (eventually ¬φ).
The weak until operator φ weakuntil ψ abbreviates φ until ψ ∨ always φ. Finally let
never φ
∆= always ¬φ.
Given a PDS pds let the notation m ` φ express the judgment that all runs starting
in the entry program point of the method m satisfy φ. More formally:
Definition 4 (Model Checking a Method Call). Given a PDS pds with the single
control location p and a method m, the judgment m ` φ is valid iff for every run r
of the PDS pds ′ from the initial configuration 〈p,m init〉, r |= φ holds, where v
is the entry program point of method m (i.e. v : entry m), pds ′ is the PDS pds ex-
tended with the fresh stack symbols m init and m loop, and the two rewrite rules
〈p,m init〉 −→ 〈p, v ·m loop〉 and 〈p,m loop〉 −→ 〈p,m loop〉 to achieve infi-
nite runs.
The definition of a judgment m ` φ is motivated by the Moped tool which imple-
ments an algorithm for checking an initial configuration with a stack of size at most one
against an LTL formula.
3.3 Specification Patterns
As in the Bandera project [CDH+00] specification patterns are used to facilitate formu-
lating correctness properties. These specification patterns concern temporal properties
of method invocations, and are either temporal patterns or judgment patterns concern-
ing the invocation of a particular method. Below a set of patterns that we have defined,
and which are commonly used, are given.
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To express that within the call of a method m the property φ holds the judgment
pattern
Within m φ
∆= m ` φ
is used. The property that a call to m1 never triggers method m2 is:
m1 never triggers m2 ≡ Within m1 (never locm2)
Next define the temporal patterns (formulas) (i) m2 after m1, i.e., m2 can only be
called after a call to m1; (ii) m2 through m1, i.e., m2 can only be called from m1; (iii)
m2 from m1, i.e., m2 can only be called directly from m1; and (iv) m1 excludes m1,
i.e., when m1 is called this excludes the possibility that m2 will later be called:
m2 after m1
∆= (never locm2) weakuntil locm1
m1 excludes m2
∆= (eventually locm1) ⇒ never locm2
m2 from m1
∆= always (¬ (locm1 ∨ locm2)⇒ next ¬locm2) ∧ ¬locm2
m2 through m1
∆=
¬locm2 weakuntil locm1
∧
(
always return m1 ⇒
next (¬locm2 weakuntil locm1)
)
The intuitive idea of the formulation of m2 from m1 is to express that the current
program point can be in method m2 only because of a direct call from m1, or because
it was already in m2, and initially the program point is not in m2. The above patterns
can be combined with the Within pattern. For example,
Within m1 (m3 after m2)
expresses that during a call to m1 the method m3 will be called only after calling m2.
An alternative technique for expressing correctness properties of behaviours of pro-
grams of stack-based languages is to use stack inspection techniques [JMT99]. Essen-
tially these techniques express constraints on the set of all possible runtime stacks. Note
however that for instance the after property above cannot directly be coded as a stack
inspection property since the calls to m1 and m2 need not be concurrent.
3.4 A Tool for Model Checking Pushdown Systems
The Moped tool [ES01] can check a pushdown system, from an initial configuration,
against an LTL formula where the atomic predicates consists of a set of atomic symbols
that checks the identity of the top stack symbol or the control location (i.e., simply
checks name equality). In case the LTL formula is falsified a reduced pushdown system
constructed from the original one, that also falsifies the LTL formula, is presented as
diagnostic information.
To represent the non-identity atomic predicates (e.g., package, entry, . . .) as “Moped
LTL formulas” a number of options are possible. Consider for instance the package
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atomic predicate. A direct representation of the predicate in Moped LTL would consist
of a disjunction over all the program points in any class in the package.
An alternative representation strategy is to enrich the translation from a call graph
to a pushdown system. Since Moped provides boolean variables we could represent the
current package identity encoded in a set of boolean variables in the pushdown sys-
tem. These variables would then be updated for every rewrite rule that crosses package
boundaries. Finally the representation of the package predicate itself would consist of
a simple boolean condition.
We have instead opted to extend the Moped tool with atomic predicates that can
match a control location, or the top stack symbol, against a regular expression. These
predicates check the syntactic shape of the symbol being tested. Consider the naming
of program points of a methodm by the call graph construction. Its entry program point
will be named m entry , its (unique) return program point will be named m exit , and
all other program points in m are of the form m n where n is a natural number.
With these conventions in place the atomic predicates can be represented in “regular
expression Moped” as indicated below:
locm ∆= m_.*
entry m ∆= m_entry
return m ∆= m_exit
class c ∆= c\..*_.*
package p ∆= p\..*\..*_.*
In the encoding it is assumed that the dot symbol ‘.’ has to be quoted using a backslash
character inside a regular expression to represent itself, rather than representing any
character. Wildcards can be used in a regular expression to achieve a limited form of
quantification over program points.
4 The SLB example: Code and Correctness Properties
This paper studies an applet developed by SchlumbergerSema, henceforth referred to
as the SLB applet study. In total the source code of the applet comprises around 765
lines of Java Card source code. As an example benchmark figure the generation of the
calling graph for the process methods of the applet, and translation of the callgraph
to a push down system, takes roughly 3 seconds2. The resulting push down system has
approximately 540 rules.
As an example we first encode the property of absence of communication with other
applets. A sufficient condition (but not strictly necessary) for establishing that the SLB
applet does not attempt to communicate with another applet3 is to check whether it
ever calls a method in another package. The property that verifies that it does not can
2 on a laptop with an Intel Pentium III Mobile CPU at 1200Mhz
3 except ones that are defined in the same Java package, as the Java Card standard communica-
tion firewall anyway only checks inter-package method calls
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be stated as (note that the applet package is named com.schlumbergersema.slb
and that API calls and calls to the synthetic methods in Events are permitted):
Within Main.process
always (package com.schlumbergersema.slb) ∨ api ∨ package Events
Similarly a sufficient condition for the absence of incoming calls to the applet is that
the applet does not define a getShareableInterfaceObject method, which is
checkable when the API is abstracted away.
In an accompanying document [Sch] a set of desirable security properties for the
SLB applet were given, including information flow control properties, memory alloca-
tion control properties, error prediction properties, and consistency control properties.
In this paper we mainly focus on the problem of checking and guaranteeing that proper
memory allocation security procedures are followed. The document specifies, that,
The SLB applet does not allocate memory after the personalization process.
Unfortunately the document does not specify what constitutes a completed person-
alization process. In the first approximation of the correctness property we consider
personalization to be completed upon the first call of the process method. The corre-
sponding property is:
Within Main.process
never (loc Events.newInst) ∨ (loc Events.newArrayInst)
That is, during the call of the process method no allocation of memory will be
attempted using the byte code instructions new or newarray. The Moped tool can
quickly4 check such a formula; for the SLB applet the result is that the formula does
not hold, and a counter example is generated automatically (a reduced system generated
from the original one that also fails to satisfy the property). As an example we include
the printout in figure 1 which shows the evolution of configurations (a pair of a control
location p and a stack of symbols) during a call to the process method. The names of
methods have been mangled, but still the figure does illustrate the problem: a call to the
process method can, via a call to the processAppendRecord method, allocate
memory using the newarray byte code instruction. The corresponding property for
allocation using the new instruction does hold, i.e., no memory is allocated after calling
the process method.
Inspecting the byte code of the applet shows that the open platform5
personalization scheme seems to be used, i.e., the code contains a call to
the method visa.openplatform.OPSystem.setCardContentState. To
check whether allocation occur only before personalization the first property is refined
into the property:
Within Main.process
always
(
loc visa.openplatform.OPSystem.setCardContentState⇒
never loc Events.newArrayInst
)
4 in less than a second, on the same hardware as was used to generate the call graph
5 http://www.globalplatform.com
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p <com_schlumbergersema_slb_Main_process_init>
p <com_schlumbergersema_slb_Main_process_entry m_loop>
p <com_schlumbergersema_slb_Main_process_77 m_loop>
p <com_schlumbergersema_slb_Main_process_78 m_loop>
p <javacard_framework_APDU_getBuffer_entry
com_schlumbergersema_slb_Main_process_81 m_loop>
p <com_schlumbergersema_slb_Main_process_81 m_loop>
...
p <com_schlumbergersema_slb_Main_processAppendRecord_292
com_schlumbergersema_slb_Main_process_ret m_loop>
p <com_schlumbergersema_slb_Main_processAppendRecord_293
com_schlumbergersema_slb_Main_process_ret m_loop>
p <com_schlumbergersema_slb_Main_processAppendRecord_294
com_schlumbergersema_slb_Main_process_ret m_loop>
p <Events_newArrayInst_entry
com_schlumbergersema_slb_Main_processAppendRecord_295
com_schlumbergersema_slb_Main_process_ret m_loop>
...
Fig. 1. An excerpt from the counter example
That is, new arrays are never allocated after the personalization method has been
called. The Moped tool confirms that this property holds of the SLB applet. Unfortu-
nately it isn’t quite strong enough to guarantee absence of allocation after personaliza-
tion. The property below expresses that any allocation must be finished with a call to
the setCardContentState method:
Within Main.process
always
(
loc Events.newArrayInst⇒
eventually loc visa.openplatform.OPSystem.setCardContentState
)
Trying to verify this property with Moped fails and a counterexample is generated.
To summarise the state-of-affairs: during any call to process there is a possibility
that personalization takes place, and if it does, no more memory is allocated. However,
there exists also the possibility of allocation during an invocation of process without
personalization being performed. This need not necessarily indicate a bug; it could be
that the application keeps a state between invocations of the process method which
records whether personalization has taken place, i.e., the allocation property is data
dependent and these data dependencies have been abstracted away during call graph
generation (generating false positives).
Clearly the call graph generation process can be refined, using static analysis tech-
niques, to take data dependencies into account. However, determining which abstrac-
tions are required to conclusively prove, or disprove, the property is in general not a task
which we can expect to be able to solve automatically. In the next section we instead
explore an alternative.
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5 Monitoring Memory Allocation
Clearly the memory allocation property is a safety property, and we can thus guarantee
the desired memory allocation property by implementing a so called runtime moni-
tor [Sch99] to control the execution of the applet.
The monitor has an obligation to preserve the (monitored) safety property and to halt
the execution of the (monitored) applet whenever it detects that the applet is about to
violate its safety property. For checking the memory allocation control property a very
simple two state runtime monitor suffices that keeps track of whether personalization
has occurred, and if it has not, permits memory allocations, and if it has, disallows
them. The applet combined with such a runtime monitor may not meet all requirements
regarding behaviour (e.g., progress properties), but it will not violate its safety property.
5.1 Implementation Details
A monitor can be implemented in different ways: in a runtime system if it is accessi-
ble, or as a separate thread/process, or the code of the runtime monitor can be directly
inlined with the monitored application. For the Java Card platform the choice of im-
plementation method is obvious given the lack of threads, and the lack of access to
API libraries. The applet code has to be physically combined with the runtime mon-
itor code, using a technique of so called code instrumentation. Any operations in the
applet code that could violate the monitor has to be preceded with monitor code that
checks whether the operation in question is safe. In this study we make the assump-
tion that allocation should not be considered when they are invoked directly by an
Java Card API method. Thus for the case study we monitor calls to the API method
visa.openplatform.OPSystem.setCardContentState and we monitor
memory allocation using the byte code instructions new and newarray from applet
code. As Java byte code is well-structured, and a byte code verifier guarantees that
calling conventions and such are adhered to, it turns out that Java is very well suited
for implementing runtime monitoring through code instrumentation; see for example
Erlingsson and Schneider [ES99] for a discussion.
We have implemented a facility for experimenting with the automatic instrumenta-
tion of Java Card programs using the Soot [VRHS+99] tool; in fact the same tool that
was used for call graph extraction. A significant advantage of using the Soot tool is that
it provides a well-defined abstract view of Java (Card) byte code methods. A method
is guaranteed to have single entry and return program points, to be composed of a se-
lect few byte code instructions (rather than arbitrary Java byte code instructions), the
runtime stack is abstracted away in favour of assignments to local variables, and for
implementing program transformations there is ample support for inserting new byte
code instructions in the middle of a method body.
To continue the SLB case study we implemented a generic transformer in Soot that
when it recognizes a new instruction (or newarray), or a call to the personalization
method, inserts an appropriate call to the runtime monitor. The code of the transformer
(for new instructions) is:
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MonitorClass = Scene.v().loadClassAndSupport("Monitor");
personalize = MonitorClass.getMethod("void personalize()");
allocating = MonitorClass.getMethod("void allocating()");
...
protected void internalTransform
(Body body, String phaseName, Map options)
{
Chain units = body.getUnits();
...
Iterator stmtIt = units.snapshotIterator();
while(stmtIt.hasNext()) {
Stmt s = (Stmt) stmtIt.next();
...
else if (containsNewExpr(s)) {
// We found a new expression, instrument it!
units.insertBefore
(Jimple.v().newStaticInvokeExpr(allocating), s);
}
}
}
...
boolean containsNewExpr(Stmt s) {
return
(s instanceof AssignStmt &&
((AssignStmt) s).getRightOp() instanceof NewExpr);
}
The monitor routine has a state variable, personalized, which determines whether
allocation is permitted:
public class Monitor {
private static boolean personalized = false;
public static void personalize() {
personalized = true;
}
public static void allocating() {
if (personalized)
ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_UNKNOWN);
}
}
Next Java byte code was generated from the intermediate representation by Soot,
generating ultimately a new applet that was combined with the monitor code. In the
process of generating byte code from the intermediate representation a number of prob-
lems peculiar to the Java Card platform had to be resolved. In our experiment Soot was
used as a Java compiler, and to be able to run the resulting (instrumented) Java Card
applet (in, for instance, Sun’s Java Card simulation tool) it is necessary to “convert it”6
6 e.g., to check that only short integer arithmetic is used
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using SUN’s Java Card Development Kit. Unfortunately the converter tool is targeted
towards converting code produced by the Sun Java compiler. To produce byte code out-
put acceptable to the converter tool we had to alter the Soot compiler to (i) generate
code that Sun’s converter would recognise as obeying the restrictions regarding the use
of short integers, and (ii) to generate object initialization code that follows the rather
harsh restrictions put forward in Java Card documentation.
Once these, and a number of minor additional problems with the compilation to
Java Card were settled, we were able to simulate the instrumented SLB applet in Sun’s
Java Card simulator. The simulation experiments showed that, had the safety preserving
monitor not being inlined, and had a certain sequence of APDU messages (events re-
ceived from the card environment) been sent to the applet, then the applet would have in
fact violated its memory allocation policy. That is, it would have attempted to allocate
fresh memory even after personalization.
Examining the source code, in order to check that the diagnosis of the runtime
monitor was correct, it turned out that the applet allocates an array of records, and that
personalization is signaled already when the first record is allocated even though later
allocations can occur.
The impact in terms of (instrumented) applet code size, of the in-memory size of
the applet, and of execution slow-down is clearly negligible. The only code additions,
except the small monitor class itself, is the calls to the monitor class signalling person-
alization and memory allocation. However the number of locations where such calls
occur are expected to be few. Similarly execution slow-down will be very low.
5.2 A Second Memory Allocation Property
As a followup to the first experiment with runtime monitoring we decided to monitor
also the weaker property of bounded memory allocation, i.e., that there is a bound on the
amount of memory the applet allocates. To permit the monitoring of this property the
memory control transformer was easily extended to also count the amount of memory
allocated (for a new or newarray instruction) by analysing the class hierarchies in
Soot. That is, the fields of an object to be allocated are computed (including fields of
superclasses), and the size of representing each field in the runtime system is estimated
(the size is not predetermined by the Java standard). Thus a new instruction in the code
was prefixed with a call to a monitor method, with as parameter the size of the allocation
request (the size of the object, or the size of the array), and which is responsible for
halting the execution of the applet if a predetermined allocation bound will be exceeded
by the execution of the new instruction.
Clearly a property such as the bounded allocation property is a good example of a
class of applet properties that can either be implemented in a card runtime system by
a card manufacturer, or, as we show in this example, it can equally well be ensured by
combining any applet code to be loaded onto a card with a well-defined runtime monitor
guaranteeing the property. Other examples of such monitorable properties interesting
for Java Card are, for instance, specific applet-to-applet communication disciplines that
are stricter than the firewall mechanism provided by the Java Card standard.
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6 Conclusions and Future Work
The paper has studied how to guarantee important security properties for a typical Java
Card application using light-weight formal methods, e.g., using model checking and by
implementing runtime monitors to forcibly ensure safety properties. The model check-
ing work uses a framework for automatic model checking of temporal constraints on
method calls in Java Card applets. The framework has been realised by combining a
class–based static analysis tool with an automatic model checker for pushdown system
and linear temporal logic. The runtime monitor experiment is promising but needs to be
properly formalised. We would like to (i) develop a generic code rewriting function that
given a safety property in (some) temporal logic inserts probes into the code to keep the
monitor state updated, and (ii) to use an available operational semantics for Java Card7
to develop a proof that the code rewriting function respects the operational semantics
of Java Card, and the semantics of the temporal logic. We would also like to study the
feasibility of using code rewriting of applets as a systematic technique to implement
card specific policies for card issuers.
Further information, including prototype implementations, regard-
ing the work presented in this paper can be found in the web page
http://www.sics.se/fdt/projects/vericode/jcave.html.
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